Does Washington have the power to impose peace in Sudan? | policy

Washington is moving with an unusual political weight towards the Sudanese file, but the American initiative, which is described as the “most serious” since the outbreak of the war, faces from its first moment a double dilemma, represented by the complex internal complications, and the absence of binding mechanisms that guarantee respect for any proposed truce.

American advisor Massad Boulos spoke to Al Jazeera about “positive responses” from both sides, but the optimism shown by Washington clashes with a very fragile Sudanese reality, where 30 months of fighting left deep distortions in confidence, making any verbal pledge worthless, unless accompanied by a clear system of accountability and guarantees, which remained absent in previous negotiations.

The analysis presented by Cameron Hudson, advisor to the former US envoy to Sudan, in the “Beyond the News” program, clearly reflected this problem, as he believed that what prevented a real breakthrough in all past initiatives was not a lack of political desire, but rather the absence of a party capable of imposing commitment.

From his point of view, the direct entry of the US President gives the current initiative a momentum that has been missing for years, but it does not eliminate the basic dilemma, which is that the two parties do not trust each other at all.

This diagnosis intersects with another vision presented by Dr. Fathi Abu Ammar, editor-in-chief of “Al-Wasat” newspaper. Although he considers the rapid support “the most welcoming” to the American initiative, he believes that this acceptance does not change a deep truth, which is that the truce in Sudan cannot last without real international monitoring.

Abu Ammar believes that the experiences of Jeddah and what followed proved that any truce without implementation mechanisms will turn into a breathing space, not an entrance to a political settlement.

Conditional truce

The scene becomes more complicated when looking at the position of the military establishment. Dr. Rashid Muhammad Ibrahim, a political analyst from Port Sudan, points out that the army views any truce from a radically different angle. It does not reject the principle of a ceasefire, but sees it as conditional on the rapid withdrawal of support from the cities and stripping them of heavy weapons.

In his estimation, this is not a negotiating condition as much as it is a “safety barrier” to prevent the repetition of the El Fasher and Khartoum scenarios.

These conflicting views make it clear that the problem is not in the formulation of the truce, but rather in the absence of a minimum level of mutual trust. While Washington talks about “urgent humanitarian aid,” the army believes that any unresolved truce enables its opponent to reposition itself, while the Rapid Support fears that the truce will be exploited to rearrange the military establishment against it.

The external factor complicates the picture. The American administration is talking about coordination with the Quartet, Qatar, and Turkey, but this multiplicity of diplomatic channels does not negate the fact that influential regional parties maintain varying relations with both sides of the conflict.

Here, Abu Ammar clearly indicates that any effort that does not affect “sources of support” will have limited impact, because the continuation of the war is linked to cross-border financing, arming, and political support networks.

In contrast to this vision, Hudson believes that Trump – if he decides to do so – can impose a new balance of deterrence, as Rapid Support is classified in Congress as a terrorist organization, and the army depends on the legitimacy of the state and the mandate of the international community.

This bilateralism gives Washington an opportunity to formulate an “equation of incentives and sanctions” that may force the two parties to commit, even if only temporarily. However, at the same time, he acknowledges that the US administration has not yet made any clear commitment to accountability mechanisms, which makes commitment more a matter of intentions than measurable pledges.

Impressive developments

On the ground, field developments appear to be a decisive factor in determining the direction of the initiative. The army is making progress in Kordofan and West El Obeid, and destroying convoys coming from eastern Libya, while the Rapid Support continues to be stationed inside the cities.

As this geographical imbalance continues, talking about a stable truce becomes almost impossible, as each party fears that the truce will give it space in which its opponent can move.

However, Washington does not seem ready to admit that the current effort may fail. Paul speaks confidently of a “transitional phase” that accompanies the truce from its first moment. However, the absence of a clear vision for the components of this phase makes the initiative vulnerable to colliding with the same obstacles that disrupted the Jeddah platform.

Sudan today is not just a country divided along military lines, but rather an area of ​​overlapping influence, in which various international and regional interests and various tribal and political calculations intersect.

The seriousness of the situation appears in that each party has come to see the war as an existential issue, as the army wants to restore the state, the Rapid Support Forces is looking for political legitimacy that it does not possess, and the United States wants to stop the human tragedy without engaging in “re-engineering” the Sudanese state.

Despite this, observers believe that Washington’s involvement with greater weight may create a new balance, provided that two basic elements are available: clear executive guarantees and a real regional consensus. Previous Sudanese experiences confirm that any settlement without strong international sponsorship remains merely a temporary declaration of intent.

Unless Washington is able to devise a formula that commits both parties to a ceasefire and gives the Sudanese a path that can be trusted, its initiative will remain just a new link in a series of initiatives that have not changed anything in Sudan’s prolonged tragedies.